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Abstract
I study a novel channel that amplifies the effects of a rise in gov-
ernment purchases. Fiscal stimulus increases aggregate demand and
boosts job creation. The latter improves employment prospects by re-
ducing idiosyncratic unemployment risk faced by households. This, in
turn, weakens precautionary motives and raises private consumption
which strengthens the initial fiscal impulse. To explore the mechanism,
I use a model with uninsured idiosyncratic risk, frictional labor mar-
ket and sticky prices. Quantitative analysis indicates that magnitude
of the employment prospects channel is substantial: its elimination
implies that crowding out of aggregate consumption associated with
higher government expenditures rises by 47%.
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1 Introduction
I study a novel channel which amplifies the macroeconomic effects of higher
government purchases through improvement in employment prospects. Fis-
cal expansion fuels aggregate demand and, due to price rigidities, leads to
adjustment in the quantity of produced goods. The latter requires larger out-
put capacity across firms and hence increases incentives to recruit additional
workers. Higher demand for labor improves employment prospects faced by
households as job creation translates into higher job finding and lower job
separation rates and, as a result, shorter expected unemployment spells in
the future. Lower unemployment risk, in turn, weakens precautionary mo-
tives, raises consumer confidence and stimulates private consumption which
amplifies the effects of fiscal stimulus. On the top of that, since changes
in employment are prolonged by labor market frictions, higher employment
persists over time and stimulates output, consumption and job creation in
future periods which, in turn, improves job prospects and stimulates private
expenditures in the current period.
Mechanism analyzed in the paper is based on a combination of two
premises. First, households are not able to insure against unemployment
and suffer from substantial drops in income and consumption expenditures
as they lose jobs. For instance, Kolsrud et al. (2015) analyze Swedish data
and find that average drop in consumption expenditures during the first year
of an unemployment spell equals 32%. Therefore, as suggested by Den Haan
et al. (2015), a worsening of employment prospects leads to an increase in
precautionary motives across consumers and induces cuts in private consump-
tion. Second, there is an ample evidence suggesting that fiscal packages have
a large impact on job creation and employment. For example, Chodorow-
Reich et al. (2012) and Serrato and Wingender (2016) find that $100,000 of
additional government expenditures in the US generate 3.8 and 3.3 job-years,
respectively. Moreover, using a structural VAR, Monacelli et al. (2010) show
that an increase in fiscal purchases equal to 1% of GDP lowers unemployment
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by 0.6% and raises labor market tightness by 20%.
To quantify the employment prospects channel it is necessary to extend
the standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari model (BHA henceforth) along two
dimensions. First ingredient that is required to analyze the problem are price
rigidities, which guarantee that higher aggregate demand generated by fiscal
package is not entirely absorbed by price adjustment.1 Second, to account
for the idiosyncratic, endogenous unemployment risk faced by households, I
blend the BHA framework with the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
model of frictional labor market.
My paper is related to works studying the effects of higher government
expenditures in models with heterogeneous households, in which a signifi-
cant proportion of agents deviates from the consumption-savings behavior
predicted by the permanent income hypothesis and thus exhibits relatively
high levels of marginal propensity to consume (MPC).
Navarro and Ferriere (2016) study the impact of changes in government
expenditures in the standard BHA model with labor indivisibility and flex-
ible prices. They find that only an increase in government spending that is
accompanied by a rise in tax progressivity is able to generate a positive re-
sponse in aggregate consumption. The reason for this fact is intuitive: when
tax progressivity increases, authorities are able to decrease the average tax
level because they tax top incomes at higher rates. Main beneficiaries of the
associated tax cuts are agents with low labor income who exhibit relatively
1Moreover, as it has been noticed by Hagedorn et al. (2017), a combination of price
stickiness and consumer heterogeneity in the BHA model (more precisely, the presence
of households with high marginal propensity to consume) gives rise to income channel
through which fiscal expansions affect private consumption: an increase in government
purchases stimulates aggregate demand which, if sticky prices are in place, translates into
higher output which, in turn, is associated with increase in labor demand. This raises
employment, imposes an upward pressure upon wages and thus leads to rise in labor
income. Since high MPC households spend a significant proportion of the increase in
labor income on consumption then aggregate demand grows even further triggering higher
labor demand, growth in labor income etc. It is thus clear, that price rigidity is key for
existence of the feedback loop which describes the traditional logic underlying the fiscal
multiplier.
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high MPC. In contrast to Navarro and Ferriere (2016), I consider a BHA
model with frictional labor and sticky prices in which government finances
expenditures with a flat-rate tax.2
It seems that the closest work to mine is Hagedorn et al. (2017) who
study the size of fiscal multiplier using a version of the BHA model with
price adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) and decompose the reaction
of private consumption to government purchases into several channels to
get a better understanding of mechanisms that propagate fiscal stimulus.
There are, however, two substantial differences between my work and the
paper of Hagedorn et al. (2017). First, I consider a different specification of
labor market that features search frictions. Second, in contrast to Hagedorn
et al. (2017), my decomposition method of aggregate consumption, which
is crucial for the isolation of employment prospects channel, is based on
the total differentiation of aggregate consumption with respect to economic
variables entering the household maximization problem.3
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2
presents the BHA model with frictional product market and sticky prices.
In Section 3 I study the effects of an increase in government expenditures
when monetary policy is relatively responsive to changes in macroeconomic
environment and stimulus is financed with taxes. Section 4 describes the
employment prospects channel. In Section 5 I consider two alternative sce-
narios of expansion. First of them assumes that the increase in government
purchases is financed with debt. Second scenario analyzes expansion dur-
ing which the response of monetary policy is less aggressive than in baseline
simulation. Section 6 concludes.
2In addition to baseline simulation, which assumes that higher government purchases
are financed with taxes, I analyze the situation in which increased fiscal expenditures are
financed with debt.
3The decomposition method used in this work can be seen as a discrete-time counterpart
of the procedure applied by Kaplan et al. (2016).
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2 Model
In this section, I describe the main building blocks of the model which is
populated by heterogeneous households, identical retailers, representative
firm and government.
2.1 Households
The model is populated by a continuum of households of measure one who
face uninsurable idiosyncratic income and labor status shocks that are driven
by: exogenous changes in labor productivity z and endogenous shifts in job-
finding rate f . The only asset actively traded in the economy is bond b
which earns nominal interest rate i.4 Labor supply is exogenous and nor-
malized to unity. Agents value consumption streams c only. The associated
instantaneous utility function is denoted by u(c) (with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0) and it
satisfies the Inada conditions. By Π I denote the ratio between current price
of consumption goods p and the price of those goods in the previous period
p−1:
Π = p
p−1
.
Employed household with productivity level z earns real wage w ·z where w is
the average real wage in the economy and the unemployed with productivity
z receives unemployment benefit equal to ν · w · z where ν ∈ (0, 1) is the
replacement rate. Idiosyncratic productivity shocks z follow a Markovian
process that takes values in space Z. Employed households pay linear tax τ
4The assumption about the degenerated portfolio choice is made to preserve tractability
and it can be rationalized by a situation in which government taxes capital dividends so
that they are standardized to 0. Similar assumption is made by Auclert (2017). In
previous versions of the paper, I have not introduced corporate tax and firm profits were
redistributed according to shares entitling to dividends that were dependent on individual
productivity and were estimated to match the moments from the SCF data. Results
obtained in that version were almost the same as in the current variant of the paper.
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on labor income.5 Unemployed household becomes employed with probability
f ′ at the beginning of next period.6 Employed consumers lose jobs with
probability σ · (1− f ′) where σ ∈ (0, 1) is exogenous separation rate. In
equilibrium rate f ′ is endogenous and depends on the ratio between job
vacancies opened by firms and the proportion of households that remains
without job at the beginning of the period. The choice of next period liquid
balances b′ is subject to borrowing constraint:
b′ ≥ −b¯
where b¯ is a positive constant. Maximization problem of employed household
with current balances b and productivity level z can be represented by the
following Bellman equation:7
We (z, b) = max
c, b′
{
u(c) + β · Ez′|z [(1− σ · (1− f ′)) ·We (z′, b′) (1)
+σ · (1− f ′) ·Wu (z′, b′)]}
subject to :c+ b
′ = 1+iΠ · b+ (1− τ) · w · z
b′ ≥ −b¯
(2)
where We and Wu are value functions associated with the dynamic problem
of employed and unemployed agent, respectively. I adopt the convention that
separations occur before hiring. Agents discount future utility streams with
5Notice, that since the number of hours worked is fixed for employed household (i.e.,
equal to one) then labor income tax is not distortionary, i.e., it has no effect on labor
supply.
6The prime symbol denotes the next period value of a variable.
7Observe that all quantities entering the maximization problem are expressed in real
terms.
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factor β ∈ (0, 1). The maximization problem of unemployed household reads:
Wu (z, b) = max
c, b′
{
u(c) + β · Ez′|z [f ′ ·We (z′, b′) (3)
+ (1− f ′) ·Wu (z′, b′)]}
subject to :c+ b
′ = 1+iΠ · b+ ν · w · z
b′ ≥ −b¯
Euler inequalities associated with dynamic problems of employed and unem-
ployed households are:
u′ (ce) ≥ 1+i
′
Π′ · β · Ez′|z [(1− σ · (1− f ′)) · u′ (c′e) + σ · (1− f ′) · u′ (c′u)]
u′ (cu) ≥ 1+i′Π′ · β · Ez′|z [f ′ · u′ (c′e) + (1− f ′) · u′ (c′u)]
(4)
where ce is consumption policy conditional on being employed and cu corre-
sponds to policy of the unemployed consumer.
2.2 Retailers
The model is populated by perfectly competitive retailers who pack differenti-
ated goods yj, where j ∈ [0, 1], produced by firms into baskets of consumption
goods y using technology described by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
y =
(∫ 1
0
y
1− 1
γ
j dj
) 1
1− 1γ
where γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
generated by firms. Retailers choose {yj} to maximize profits:
p · y −
∫ 1
0
pjyjdj
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where pj is price of variety produced by firm j. The following equation
describes first order condition of the retailer:
yj =
(
pj
p
)−γ
· y (5)
where p reads:
p =
(∫ 1
0
p1−γj dj
) 1
1−γ
.
2.3 Firms
There is measure one of firms owned by households and indexed with j ∈ [0, 1]
that produce intermediate goods using linear technology with labor n as the
only input and hire workers in the frictional labor market by posting vacancies
vj. The probability that vacancy is filled equals q which, similarly to f , is
endogenous and depends on the ratio between job vacancies opened by firms
and the proportion of households that remains without job at the beginning
of the period. Proportion σ of existing job is destroyed between periods.
For tractability, it is assumed that firms are not able to distinguish be-
tween more productive and less productive workers while recruiting them.
Once the worker is hired, firm learns about his productivity and pays wage
that is proportional to his productivity level. The assumption about un-
observability of z during the recruitment process enables to blend together
the idiosyncratic income risk captured by changes in z with the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides specification of labor market.
Firms are monopolistically competitive and set prices subject to quadratic
price adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) and subject to demand for
their products given by equation 5. Future profit streams are discounted
with real interest rate Π′1+i′ where Π is the ratio between the current price
level and the one from the previous period.8
8Observe that firms discount future profits with the real interest rate and not with the
standard stochastic discount factor that is dependent on agents marginal utilities. The
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Firms solve a dynamic problem of maximizing the discounted sum of real
profits:
F (pj,−1, nj,−1) = max
pj ,vj ,nj ,yj
{
pj
p
· yj − Ez (w · z · nj)− κ · vj
−φ2
(
pj − pj,−1
pj,−1
)2
· y + Π
′
1 + i′ · F (pj, nj)
 (6)
subject to :
yj = Ez (z · nj)
yj =
(
pj
p
)−γ
· y
nj = (1− σ) · nj,−1 + q · vj . (7)
where φ > 0 is a parameter, F is value function associated with the firm
maximization problem, pj,−1 is price set in the previous period, nj,−1 is the
number of workers employed in the previous period. First constraint de-
scribes production technology, second constraint captures the demand for
goods produced by firm j and third describes the law of motion for employ-
ment in firm j. Moreover, it is assumed that Ezz = 1.
In the symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms are identical and hence
subscripts j can be omitted, first order condition that characterizes the op-
timal solution to problem 6 reads:
1− γ + w · γ + γ · κ
q
− Π
′
1 + i′ ·
κ · (1− σ) · γ
q′
(8)
latter becomes problematic if agents exhibit heterogeneous asset holdings and consumption
rates (see Gornemann et al. (2016) and Den Haan et al. (2015)). The simplification applied
here makes the calibration exercise tractable and was used, for example, by Kaplan et al.
(2016) and Hagedorn et al. (2017).
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= φ · (Π− 1) · Π− Π
′
1 + i′ · φ · (Π
′ − 1) · Π′ · y
′
y
.
Finally, let us define the real value of firm’s profits d:
d ≡ n− w · n− κ · v − φ2 · (Π− 1)
2 · n. (9)
2.4 Government
Government consists of two branches: fiscal authority and monetary author-
ity. In stationary equilibrium, fiscal branch is assumed to run a balanced
budget - i.e., it adjusts tax rate τ to finance purchases of manufactured goods
G, expenditures on unemployment benefits and the cost of debt service net
of firms’ profits that are transferred directly to government:
n · τ · w + d = (1− n) · ν · w + 1 + iΠ ·B −B
′ +G (10)
where B is the real value of bonds issued by government in the previous
period. It is assumed that the level of government purchases in stationary
equilibrium is equal to zero:
Gss = 0.
Central bank sets the value of nominal interest rate i ≥ 0 according to the
following Taylor-type monetary policy rule:
i = i¯+ φy · y − yss
yss
+ φΠ · (Π− Πss)
where Πss and yss are values of Π and y in stationary equilibrium and i¯, φy
and φΠ are parameters.
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2.5 Wage-setting
Since there is no universal theory that would pin down wages in labor mar-
ket featuring search frictions then, while analyzing stationary equilibrium,
I assume that w is parameter that is set to match the calibration target
presented in Section 3.9
2.6 Consistency Conditions
Market clearing condition for manufactured goods reads:
∫
ce (b, z) dpie(b, z) +
∫
cu (b, z) dpiu(b, z) + κ · v (11)
+φ2 · (Π− 1)
2 · y +G = y
where ce (b, z) and cu (b, z) are policy functions associated with dynamic prob-
lems of employed and unemployed households, respectively and by pie(b, z) I
denote the measure of employed agents with asset holdings b and productivity
z. An analogous object associated with unemployed households is denoted
by piu(b, z). Market clearing condition for liquid assets is:∫
b′e (b, z) dpie(b, z) +
∫
b′u (b, z) dpiu(b, z) = B′.
Labor market tightness satisfies:
x = v1− (1− σ) · n−1 (12)
Observe that the pool of workers available to firms during the recruitment
process (given by the denominator of 12) consists of workers who were unem-
ployed in the previous period 1 − n−1 and those who worked but were fired
at the beginning of the current period: σn−1.
9Of course, w must be an element of bargaining set (see Hall (2005)) which is the case
in the calibrated version of the model.
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Probabilities f and q are induced by a constant returns to scale matching
technology M and satisfy:
f = M (v, 1− (1− σ) · n−1)1− (1− σ) · n−1 = M (x, 1) (13)
q = M (v, 1− (1− σ) · n−1)
v
= M
(
1, 1
x
)
. (14)
The law of motion of agents across states is characterized by two equations:
pie (B′, z′) = (1− σ · (1− f ′)) ·
∫
Z×{b:b′e(b,z)∈B′}
P(z′|z)dpie(b, z) (15)
+f ′ ·
∫
Z×{b:b′u(b,z)∈B′}
P(z′|z)dpiu(b, z)
piu (B′, z′) = σ · (1− f ′) ·
∫
Z×{b:b′e(b,z)∈B′}
P(z′|z)dpie(b, z) (16)
+(1− f ′) ·
∫
Z×{b:b′u(b,z)∈B′}
P(z′|z)dpiu(b, z)
where B′ is a Borel subset of [−b¯,+∞), P(z′|z) is transition probability be-
tween states z and z′ determined by the Markovian process which takes values
in space Z. Finally, it is required that:
∫
dpie(b, z) +
∫
dpiu(b, z) = 1, (17)
i.e., the total measure of households equals one.
2.7 Stationary Equilibrium
Having defined maximization problems of households and firms, government
budget constraints, price-setting mechanisms and market clearing (and con-
sistency) conditions, we are in position to define the stationary equilibrium
of the model:
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Definition. A stationary equilibrium is: positive numbers x, value functions
We and Wu, policy functions ce, cu, b′e, b′u and probability distributions pie,
piu such that given τ , b¯, i, Π, w, d and B:
(a) Value functions solve household maximization problems given x, τ ,
Π, w, i and ce, cu, b′e, b′u are the associated policy functions,
(b) Numbers x, Π, w, v, n, d satisfy equations 6-9 associated with firm’s
problem,
(c) Government budget constraint holds, G = 0, B = B′ and i = i¯,
(d) Measures pie and piu are a fixed point of the dynamical system described
by equations 15-17,
(e) Consistency conditions and market clearing conditions hold.
In the Appendix, I present an algorithm that computes the stationary
equilibrium of the model.
3 Increase in Fiscal Purchases: Baseline Sim-
ulation
In this section, I calibrate the model and simulate the transitional path of
main economic aggregates resulting from an unexpected, transitory change
in government purchases.
3.1 Calibration
3.1.1 Functional Forms
First, let us specify the functional form of utility function u. It is assumed
that it takes the following form:
u (c) = c
1−θ
1− θ
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where θ is the rate of relative risk aversion. Second, let us concentrate on
matching technology M . Following Ramey et al. (2000), I assume that M is
specified as:
M (v, 1− (1− σ) · n−1) = v · (1− (1− σ) · n−1)
(vα + (1− (1− σ) · n−1)α)
1
α
where α > 1.
3.1.2 Parameter Values
The time period is a quarter. Targets of my calibration are moments char-
acterizing US economy. Model parameters can be divided into two groups.
First of them contains parameters that are set with reference to the literature
and second group is calibrated using the model to match moments observed
in the data.
Parameters taken from the literature are: relative risk aversion θ, sep-
aration rate σ, replacement rate ν, parameters associated with the process
governing exogenous productivity shocks, elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods γ, parameters associated with Taylor rule - φΠ and φy
and lower bound on asset holdings b¯. I set θ = 2 which is a standard value
in the literature. Following Shimer (2005), I set σ = 0.057 and ν = 0.4.
Similarly to Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), I assume that the evolution of
logs of idiosyncratic productivity z follows an AR(1) process with autocor-
relation ρz = 0.9674 and variance z = 0.0172 chosen to match evidence
documented by Floden and Lindé (2001). Next, I use the procedure con-
structed by Tauchen (1986) to approximate the AR(1) process by a discrete
Markov chain and the associated space Z of its values consists of 12 points.
I set γ = 11 to match the monopolistic markup equal to 10%. I follow the
textbook of Galí and I assume that parameters associated with Taylor rule
are φΠ = 1.5 and φy = 0.125. Finally, I follow McKay and Reis (2016) and
standardize the liquidity constraint b¯ to 0. Calibrated parameter values of θ,
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Table 1: Parameters set with reference to the literature
Parameter Description Value Source
θ Relative risk aversion 2 Standard value
σ Separation rate 0.057 Shimer (2005)
ν Replacement rate 0.4 Shimer (2005)
ρz Persistence of productivity shock 0.9674 Floden and Lindé (2001)
z Variance of productivity shock 0.0172 Floden and Lindé (2001)
γ Elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods
11 Standard value
φΠ Taylor rule parameter (inflation) 1.5 Galí (2008)
φy Taylor rule parameter (output gap) 0.125 Galí (2008)
b¯ Liquidity constraint 0 McKay and Reis (2016)
σ, µ, ρz, z, γ, φΠ, φy, b¯ are summarized in Table 1.
Let us turn to parameters that are calibrated by matching the moments
generated by the model with their empirical counterparts. As in Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2011), I assume that the steady state value of the annual real
interest rate equals 2.5% and is targeted by β. Real interest rate, in turn,
is induced by the annual nominal interest rate equal to 4.5% and annual
inflation rate of 2% (inflation target of the Fed). The first value becomes the
calibration target for i¯ which equals (1 + 0.045)
1
4 −1. The latter implies that
Πss = (1 + 0.02)
1
4 − 1. Real wage w is adjusted to match the unemployment
rate u equal to 5% where:
u ≡ 1− n.
As in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), parameter α characterizing matching
in labor market is calibrated so that quarterly vacancy filling rate in the
model q equals 97.6%. Parameter κ is chosen to match the ratio between
recruitment costs spent on each hired and worker’s wage reported by Silva and
Toledo (2009) that equals 0.14 for quarterly labor earnings. I follow Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2011) in setting the steady state value of government bonds
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Table 2: Parameters calibrated with the model
Parameter Description Value Target
β Discount factor 0.96 Proportion of indebted agents
i¯ Nominal interest rate in
s.s.
(1 + 0.045)
1
4 − 1 Annual nominal rate of 4.5%
w Nominal wage 0.76 Unemployment rate
α Parameter associated with
function M
3.74 Quarterly vacancy filling rate
97.6%
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.12 Ratio between recruitment costs
and wages as in Silva and Toledo
(2009)
B Aggregate supply of bonds 6.76 Ratio between liquid assets and
GDP
φ Parameter of price
adjustment costs
61.0 Evidence by Zbaracki et al. (2004)
B to match the ratio between liquid asset holdings of households and annual
GDP equal to 1.78. Tax rate τ is set to balance government budget. Finally,
I calibrate the parameter associated with price adjustment costs φ to match
the evidence documented by Zbaracki et al. (2004) who find that the physical,
managerial, and customer costs of changing prices amount to 1.22 percent of
the firm’s revenue in a given year.
3.2 Increase in Government Purchases
In this section I study the effects of an unexpected, transitory increase in
government purchases G. First, I discuss the modifications that need to be
introduced into the model to study the dynamic impact of the rise in fiscal
consumption. Second, I present simulation results.
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3.2.1 Transitional Dynamics: Technical Issues
It is assumed that economy is in stationary equilibrium in period t = 0. In
period t = 1 there is an unexpected increase in government purchases which
rise from zero at t = 0 to 1% of the stationary equilibrium level of GDP at
t = 1. For t > 1, government spending is governed by autoregressive process
and decays at rate 0.8. I assume that for t > 1 agents have perfect foresight
about evolution of aggregate variables. As t → +∞, economy converges
back to its initial allocation from period t = 0. In practice, it is assumed
that economy is back in the stationary equilibrium in period t = T¯ where T¯
is sufficiently large.
As it has been mentioned, as there is no universal theory of price-setting
in frictional markets then we have some freedom in specifying the behavior
of wages. While analyzing the transitional dynamics, I assume a perfect
degree of indexation of nominal wages to the price level associated with
manufactured goods which implies that real wages are constant over time.
This formulation resembles the specification of the process governing real
wages in works by Michaillat (2012) and Blanchard and Galí (2010) who
assume that w co-moves with aggregate productivity. As the latter remains
unchanged in my simulation then it implies that the average real wage does
not change, too. Finally, in the baseline simulation I assume that increase in
G is financed with taxes τ and hence B remains constant over time. I will
analyze the situation in which higher government purchases are covered with
a rise in B in Section 5.
Endogenous Grid Method (see Carroll (2006)) is applied to solve the
model and to compute transitional dynamics. More details on the solution
algorithm are provided in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Simulation Results
First, let us define a new variable - aggregate consumption, which is the main
object of interest in my analysis:
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions, main aggregate variables, deviations from
stationary equilibrium values, baseline simulation.
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C ≡
∫
ce (b, z) dpie(b, z) +
∫
cu (b, z) dpiu(b, z).
Figure 1 displays the impact of the rise in government purchases on main
economic variables. First, notice that output increases less than one-for-one
with G - the multiplier in period t = 1 is equal to 0.98. It does not exceed
unity because aggregate consumption C drops by about 0.14% at t = 1 and
this negative impact is not mitigated by the rise in job creating activities κ ·v
and in price adjustment cost which contribute to the economy-wide aggregate
demand according to equation 11. Observe that higher government expen-
ditures lead to a substantial decrease in unemployment rate which drops by
almost 0.8 percentage points - a value that is not very far from the VAR
estimates reported by Monacelli et al. (2010).
Let us analyze the behavior of two additional variables associated with
labor market: v and f that are reported in the bottom row of Figure 1.
Intuitively, transitory fiscal expansion raises current and future aggregate
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demand which spurs job creation across firms when price rigidities are in
place. This process is particularly intense at the beginning of fiscal expansion
as rational firms anticipate the future drop in the pool of jobless workers
and the associated rise in effective recruitment costs, which is captured by
lower vacancy filling rate q (which mirrors the behavior of f), and hence
they choose to intensify hiring activities in period t = 1 when this pool is
relatively large.10 The rapid increase in vacancy posting at the beginning of
fiscal intervention explains the spike in the job-finding rate at t = 1.
Variables associated with monetary and fiscal policy are presented in
Figure 2. Fiscal intervention leads to a sharp increase in nominal interest
rates (by about 0.8 percentage points in annual terms). This reflects the
reaction of monetary authority to the rise in output which is determined
by Taylor rule. Higher nominal interest rates elevate real rates and thus
strengthen incentives to save and to cut consumption. Additionally, fiscal
stimulus leads to a 1.9 percentage point growth in tax rate τ .
It is instructive to study the determinants of changes in τ . Except for
adjusting to higher level of G, there are several additional forces that shape
the response of labor tax. On the one hand, observe that higher quarterly
nominal interest rate, raises debt service cost i·B. This reflects an interaction
between fiscal and monetary policy during which the latter leans against the
former and, as a result, decreases its effectiveness. Higher debt service costs
impose an upward pressure on tax rate τ - see equation 10. On the other
hand, however, fiscal expansion decreases employment which has two effects
that tend to decrease rate τ : i) higher employment means that labor tax
base w · n is larger which induces lower rates τ ii) at the same time, the
increase in n lowers government expenditures associated with unemployment
benefits which, again, imposes a downward pressure on τ . On the top of
that, labor tax depends on corporate tax which is equal to firm profits in the
10Putting differently, firms intensify recruitment when labor market tightness is rela-
tively low.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions, fiscal and monetary variables, deviations
from stationary equilibrium values, baseline simulation.
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model. Observe that d drops in period t = 1: this occurs because, as it has
been mentioned above, firms invest lots of resources in posting vacancies v
to create new jobs at t = 1 which, by 9, translates into lower profits. As the
job creation decays, monopolistic firms generate higher profits when faced by
higher aggregate demand associated with larger G. All this means, that the
effects of corporate tax on labor income tax τ is non-monotonic over time.
Since the rise in government purchases stimulates aggregate demand then
we observe higher inflation that grows by 0.2 percentage points at the peak.
4 Employment Prospects Channel
Let us turn to the main exercise of the paper which aims at isolating the em-
ployment prospects channel from the impulse response function of aggregate
consumption.
First, let us discuss the consumption decomposition method more gen-
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erally. Observe that aggregate consumption in period t > 0 can be totally
differentiated with respect to elements of set Xs of all endogenous variables
which appear in the maximization problems 1 and 3 in period s > 0:11
dCt =
+∞∑
s=1
∑
xs∈Xs
∂Ct
∂xs
· dxs (18)
where:
Xs = {ws,Πs, τs, fs+1, is} .
Thus, formula 18 allows to decompose the response of aggregate consumption
into channels which have a clear, model-based interpretation. In particular,
element ∑+∞s=1 ∂Ct∂fs+1dfs+1 is given by:
+∞∑
s=1
∂Ct
∂fs+1
dfs+1 =
+∞∑
s=1
∂
∂fs+1
 ∑
a∈{e,u}
∫
ca,t (b, z) dpia,t (b, z)
 dfs+1.
and can be interpreted as the accumulated effect of variation in elements of
transition path {fs+1}+∞s=1 on aggregate consumption in period t. Notice that
the formula above does not isolate the impact of employment prospects on
aggregate consumption in a proper way. It is because it fails to eliminate
the effect of job-finding rate f on the composition of agents (employed and
unemployed workers) which works through the evolution of the aggregate
distribution of households captured by equations 15 and 16. Nevertheless,∑+∞
s=1
∂Ct
∂fs+1
dfs+1 can be decomposed further into two parts:
+∞∑
s=1
∂Ct
∂fs+1
· dfs+1 =
+∞∑
s=1
∑
a∈{e,u}
(∫
ca,t (b, z) ·
{
∂
∂fs+1
p˜ia,t (b, z)
}
dbdz
)
· dfs+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
"Compositional" channel
11This is a discrete time version of the procedure described in Kaplan et al. (2016).
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Figure 3: Employment prospects channel, baseline simulation.
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. (19)
where p˜i is the density function associated with measure pi.12 Since formula
19 does not exclude a possibility that t > s then it may appear that the
second component captures the impact of past job finding rates on current
aggregate consumption which, in turn, would mean that its name - “em-
ployment prospects” channel is not adequate. To see why it is not the case,
observe that since the optimization problems are forward looking then:13
∂
∂fs+1
ca,t (b, z) = 0 for s < t.
12For tractability and for notational purposes, I assume than p˜i exists.
13Formally, policy function ca,t depends on individual state variables b, z and the vector
of aggregate state variables pie, piu, p−1 and n−1. Dependence on the latter is omitted in
the text for clarity.
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This implies that:
+∞∑
s=1
∑
a∈{e,u}
(∫ { ∂
∂fs+1
ca,t (b, z)
}
· p˜ia,t (b, z) dbdz
)
· dfs+1
=
+∞∑
s≥t
∑
a∈{e,u}
(∫ { ∂
∂fs+1
ca,t (b, z)
}
· p˜ia,t (b, z) dbdz
)
· dfs+1
which shows that second component in formula 19 captures solely the impact
of future job-finding rates on private consumption. This means that its name
- “employment prospects channel” - is justified.
From the numerical point of view, the “unemployment prospects” compo-
nent is calculated by performing the “backward iteration” with all variables
from set Xs taking their steady state values - except for the path of job find-
ing rates which takes values calculated in Section 3. Then, using calculated
policies, I perform the “forward iteration” and, at the same time, I keep the
distribution of agents equal to its stationary equilibrium value. Procedures
of “backward” and “forward” iterations are described in the Appendix.
Figure 3 displays the response of aggregate consumption which has been
already presented in Figure 1 together with the hypothetical path of house-
hold spending when employment prospects channel is closed. More precisely,
elements of the latter are defined as:
Ct −
+∞∑
s≥t
∑
a∈{e,u}
(∫ { ∂
∂fs+1
ca,t (b, z)
}
· p˜ia,t (b, z) dbdz
)
· dfs+1.
Figure 3 indicates, that the magnitude of the analyzed channel is significant.
In particular, a drop in aggregate consumption associated with fiscal stimulus
in period t = 1 is 47% larger when the role of employment prospects is
ignored.
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5 Increase in Fiscal Purchases: two alterna-
tive scenarios
In this part, I verify the robustness of the finding concerning the magnitude
of the employment prospects channel by analyzing its importance under two
additional scenarios. First of them assumes that monetary policy is less
responsive to changes in macroeconomic environment which is formalized by
changing the value of parameter φy from 0.125 to 0. This variant is motivated
partly by a large literature studying the effects of government purchases when
monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates which, automatically, makes monetary policy less responsive to changes
in G (see, e.g., Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011)). Second scenario
studies an alternative way of financing fiscal expansion which is based on an
increase in government debt B instead of the rise in taxes τ during the first
year of intervention.
5.1 Less aggressive monetary policy
Figure 4 shows the effects of an increase in government expenditures on
main economic variables when monetary policy rule is modified by setting
φy = 0. The resulting multiplier value in period t = 1 amounts to 1.30 and
it exceeds unity mainly due to the fact that, in contrast to baseline scenario,
aggregate consumption grows during fiscal expansion. The resulting drop in
unemployment is deeper and it equals 1.1 percentage points. Notice that
the rise in aggregate demand that is driven by both higher G and C creates
stronger incentives to expand output capacity by creating new jobs than in
the baseline case which is captured by a more dynamic increase in posted
vacancies v and in job finding rate f .
To understand the behavior of aggregate consumption, it is useful to
analyze changes in nominal interest rates and taxes which are displayed in
Figure 5.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions, main aggregate variables, deviations from
stationary equilibrium values, simulation assumes φy = 0.
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Observe, that since monetary policy does not react to the positive change
in output gap, then the overall response of nominal rates is much more mod-
erate than in the baseline case. More precisely, i grows by 0.1 percentage
points at t = 1 in comparison to almost 0.2 percentage points before. This
implies, that intertemporal substitution effects spurred by monetary policy,
which strengthen saving incentives, are two times smaller when φy = 0. This,
in turn, mitigates the downward pressure of higher nominal rates on aggre-
gate consumption.
Let us turn to the behavior of tax rate τ . Again, its value grows only
by a half of the rise in τ calculated in the previous scenario. To understand
this difference, observe that in contrast to the case in which monetary pol-
icy follows the Taylor Rule that is affected by output gap, a version of the
monetary rule that assumes φy = 0 implies lower growth in nominal which
results in a more moderate growth in debt service costs which, in turn, sub-
stantially reduces an upward pressure on tax τ . On the top of that, due to a
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions, fiscal and monetary variables, deviations
from stationary equilibrium values, simulation assumes φy = 0.
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more pronounced decrease in unemployment, transfers to jobless households
drop and the labor tax base expands, which reduces the rise in rates τ even
further.
Summing up, a less intensive increase in i and τ when φy = 0 is the main
cause of the switch in the sign of aggregate consumption response to fiscal
expansion with respect to baseline scenario. Notice that higher private de-
mand stimulates output, job creation, improves employment prospects which,
in turn, boosts private consumption even further, etc. Thus, a reduction in
growth of i and τ sets in motion a feedback loop of general equilibrium
effects which generate a substantial difference between the results of fiscal
policy under different monetary regimes.
Finally, let us investigate the role of employment prospects channel when
φy = 0. Results of the simulation are presented in Figure 6. It turns out
that once the improvement in job prospects is ignored, response of aggregate
consumption to higher government purchases switches its sign and becomes
negative. This outcome underscores a prominent role of job prospects in the
propagation of fiscal stimulus packages and shows that the analyzed channel
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Figure 6: Employment prospects channel, simulation assumes φy = 0.
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is robust to changes in assumption about monetary policy rule.
5.2 Debt-financed stimulus
Let us study the effects of the stimulus financed with an increase in gov-
ernment debt. Using the same, autoregressive path of government spending
{Gt}T¯t=1 as in two previous cases, I set the path of real public debt {Bt}T¯t=1
so that it satisfies:
Bt+1 = Bss +
∑t
s=1Gs for 0 < t ≤ t′
Bt+1 = Bss +
(
1− t−t′
t′′−t′
)
·∑t′s=1Gs for t′ < t ≤ t′′
Bt+1 = Bss for t′′ < t ≤ T¯ .
In other words, from period t = 1 to period t = t′, increase in government
expenditures is completely absorbed by public debt. Next, between periods
t′ and t′′, the initial increase in government debt is reduced to its steady state
level (I assume a linear pace of downward adjustment). For periods t > t′′
onward, the real value of public debt is identical to Bss.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions, main aggregate variables, deviations from
stationary equilibrium values, debt financed government purchases.
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In the simulations, I set t′ = 4 and t′′ = 40: the stimulus is financed
entirely with public debt during the first year and then, the additional debt
issued at the beginning is repaid within 10 years from the onset of expansion.
Clearly, we need to guarantee that government budget constraint is satisfied
for each period t ∈
{
1, 2, ..., T¯
}
and hence τ adjusts to balance the budget.
Figure 7 displays the impact of a rise in government purchases on main
economic aggregates when B follows the path described above. The fiscal
spending multiplier value in period t = 1 amounts to 1.03 and it is larger
than in the baseline scenario mainly because the crowding out of private
consumption drops by about a half. The resulting drop in unemployment is
more pronounced and it is equal to 0.9 percentage points.
It is crucial to understand the reasons for which the downturn in aggre-
gate consumption is more moderate when fiscal stimulus is financed with
debt in the first year of expansion. As it has been observed by Hagedorn
et al. (2017), such reaction is not very surprising given the fact that the rise
in G first boosts aggregate demand but, at the same time, this stimulat-
ing effect is then offset through raising taxes τ which affects income of all
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions, fiscal and monetary variables, deviations
from stationary equilibrium values, debt financed government purchases.
0 5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
0 5 10 15 20
-10
0
10
0 5 10 15 20
-10
0
10
0 5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
0 5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05
workers. In particular, it has an impact on those with low levels of wealth
who exhibit high MPC and thus larger τ decreases their consumption sig-
nificantly. The situation is very different when higher G is financed with a
rise in B. First, higher debt enables to reduce tax rate τ (see the top right
panel of Figure 8) and hence the adverse effects of τ on incomes of high
MPC workers is mitigated. Second, the newly issued debt is mainly bought
by low MPC workers whereas high MPC households consume additional in-
come generated by the stimulus. In other words, deficit financed expansion
leads to an implicit redistribution from asset-rich workers, who exhibit low
MPC and whose main source of financing expenditures is asset income, to
low-asset households with high MPC who rely more on labor income that,
through changes in labor market status, is highly dependent on job creation
that takes place during fiscal expansion.
Notice that, similarly to baseline scenario, the response of monetary pol-
icy is relatively aggressive and leads to a rise in nominal interest rates by 0.8
percentage points (in annual terms) at the peak. First, this process results in
stronger incentives to save which imposes a downward pressure on consump-
29
Figure 9: Employment prospects channel, debt financed government purchases.
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tion. Second, it elevates the cost of debt service cost and leads to higher
taxes. This explains why τ rises despite the fact that higher G is financed
with debt. Independently of that, debt service costs increase automatically
because B is raised in this scenario.
Observe that higher C in comparison to the baseline simulation leads to
higher job creation and larger reduction in unemployment risk captured with
the inverse of f . This, in turn, leads to additional multiplier effects between
better employment prospects and private demand which reduce the drop in
C and raise f even further in comparison to the benchmark.
Figure 9 displays the role of employment prospects channel when G is
financed with debt. It turns out that crowding out of private consumption
increases by almost 95% if the mechanism is ignored. The magnitude of the
channel is larger than in baseline scenario because the reaction of job finding
probability to change in G is stronger.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed and quantified a channel which propagates the ef-
fects of fiscal purchases through improvement in job prospects. To this end,
I have used an extended version of the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari (BHA) with
frictional labor and sticky prices. Baseline simulation indicates that that the
role of employment prospects channel for the effectiveness of fiscal expendi-
tures is substantial: a hypothetical scenario in which the channel is shut off
predicts a rise crowding out of private consumption by 47%.
To verify the robustness of this finding, I have analyzed two additional
scenarios: the one in which monetary policy is less responsive to changes in
output gap and the second in which expansion in fiscal purchases is financed
with debt. The results of those simulations corroborate the finding from the
baseline scenario: the role of employment prospects is a crucial force shaping
the aggregate consumption response to change in government purchases.
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Appendix
Solution Algorithm: Stationary Equilibrium
Steps:
1. Guess Π. Given i¯ it defines the steady state value of real interest rate.
2. For a given Π:
(a) Compute q from 8.
(b) Given q compute x from 14 and f from 13 given x. Then, use the
fact that q ·v = M (v, 1− (1− σ) · n) (equation 14) to reformulate
the stationary version of equation 7 to get:
σ · n = M (v, 1− (1− σ) · n)
and divide by 1− (1− σ)n to get (the CRS property of M works
here):
σ · n
1− (1− σ)n = M (x, 1)
so given x we are able to obtain n. Take n, q to derive v from the
equilibrium condition concerning the job market flows:
σ · n = q · v.
(c) Given Π, n and v compute firm’s profits d.
(d) Given n, d, Π, G = 0 and parameters Bss, i¯ derive τ from 10.
(e) We are in position to use the EGM method to obtain policy func-
tions {cu (b, z)}b,z and {ce (b, z)}b,z as we have already calculated
all endogenous variables that are taken as given by households:
f ′ = f , Π, τ and i = i¯.
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(f) Use {cu (b, z)}b,z, {ce (b, z)}b,z and household budget constraints
to derive {b′u (b, z)}b,z and {b′e (b, z)}b,z. Use them together with
f ′ = f to compute the fixed point of the dynamical system that
consists of 15 and 16: measures {pie (b, z)}b,z, {piu (b, z)}b,z.
(g) Given {b′u (b, z)}b,z and {b′e (b, z)}b,z and {pie (b, z)}b,z, {piu (b, z)}b,z
calculate households’ demand for liquid assets:
Bdemand =
∫
b′e (b, z) dpie (b, z) +
∫
b′u (b, z) dpiu (b, z) .
3. Use the following formula:
Πnew = Π +  · (Bdemand −B)
where  is a small positive number. The idea is that if demand for liquid
assets calculated for Π exceeded the number B then to move towards
equilibrium in which Bdemand = B we need to disincentivize households
from saving. This is done by increasing Π which reduces the real inter-
est rate. Finally, replace Π with Πnew. Iterate until convergence - i.e.
when |Bdemand −B| is sufficiently small.
Solution Algorithm: Transition
I will discuss the procedure which is used to compute the transitional dy-
namics of the model.
1. Set a sufficiently large number T¯ (the end of the transition - economy is
assumed to be back in the stationary equilibrium in period T¯ ) and set{
cu,T¯ (b, z)
}
b,z
= {cu (b, z)}b,z,
{
ce,T¯ (b, z)
}
b,z
= {ce (b, z)}b,z,ΠT¯ = Πss,
fT¯ = fss , qT¯ = qss. Set the initial distribution of agents across
nominal wealth and productivity {pie,1 (b, z)}b,z = {pie (b, z)}b,z and
{piu,1 (b, z)}b,z = {piu (b, z)}b,z. Guess the paths of: price ratios {Πt}T¯−1t=1 ,
interest rates {it}T¯t=1, employment {nt}T¯t=1 and auxiliary path of objects
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{p˜t}T¯t=1 which satisfies Πt = Πss · p˜tp˜t−1 . It is introduced to improve the
convergence properties of the algorithm as guessing the path {Πt}T¯−1t=1
did not lead to successful calculations. The idea is that p˜t affects both
the rate Πt that determines the value of households wealth via holdings
bt and the real interest rate 1+i
′
Π′ that governs consumption/savings de-
cisions in period t. Using the postulated AR(1) process and the initial
value G1 = 0.01 ·yss compute the path of real government expenditures
{Gt}T¯t=1.
2. For t = T¯ − 1 back to t = 1:
(a) Given Πt+1, Πt, qt+1, it+1, yt+1 = nt+1 and yt = nt compute qt
from 8.
(b) Given qt compute xt from 14 and ft from 13 given xt. Use qt and
the guessed values of nt and nt−1 to obtain vt from 7.
(c) Use 9 and vt and guessed values of nt and Πt to compute dt.
(d) Use guessed values of nt, it, Πt and computed dt to get τt from 10.
(e) BACKWARD ITERATION:We are in position to use equations/inequalities
4 and budget constraints from 1 and 3 and to apply the EGM
procedure to derive {cu,t (b, z)}b,z and {ce,t (b, z)}b,z. It is because
we have either derived or guessed all endogenous variables that
are taken as given by households: it, ft+1, Πt, τt and we know
{cu,t+1 (b, z)}b,z and {ce,t+1 (b, z)}b,z.
3. For t = 1 to t = T¯ − 1 (FORWARD ITERATION):
(a) Given {pie,t (b, z)}b,z, {piu,t (b, z)}b,z and ft compute the distribu-
tion of agents after labor market shocks (i.e., after separations
and job finding) which take place at the beginning of the period
and before agents make their consumption/saving choices. Denote
those distributions by {p˜ie,t (b, z)}b,z, {p˜iu,t (b, z)}b,z. Integrate to
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obtain nt:
nt =
∑
b,z
{p˜ie,t (b, z)}b,z .
It becomes the new guess for nt in further iterations.
(b) Given {cu,t (b, z)}b,z and {ce,t (b, z)}b,z and budget constraints de-
rive {bu,t+1 (b, z)}b,z and {be,t+1 (b, z)}b,z. Combine them with {p˜ie,t (b, z)}b,z,
{p˜iu,t (b, z)}b,z to derive {pie,t+1 (b, z)}b,z, {piu,t+1 (b, z)}b,z and to ob-
tain the aggregate demand for liquid assets in period t:
Bdemand,t =
∫
be,t+1 (b, z) dp˜ie,t (b, z) +
∫
bu,t+1 (b, z) dp˜iu,t (b, z) .
4. For each t ∈
{
1, 2, ..., T¯ − 1
}
calculate:
(a) An new guess of the artificial and auxiliary object p˜t:
p˜newt = p˜t −  · (Bdemand,t −B) ·
The idea is that if demand for liquid assets is to large in compar-
ison to supply B then we need to discourage agents from saving
by lowering the quasi price level p˜t so that they consume more.
Replace p˜t with p˜newt .
(b) Use Πt = Πss · p˜tp˜t−1 to derive the new guess for the price ratio in
period t.
(c) Use Taylor rule to modify the guess for it.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until the value |Bdemand,t −B| is sufficiently small for
all t.
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